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GOVERNANCE CONTROL MECHANISMS IN PORTUGUESE 
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT COOPERATIVES 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Over the last decade Portuguese Agricultural Credit Cooperatives (ACCs) have increasingly face 
survival challenges related to their difficulty in gathering equity. The main source of ACCs equity is the 
net benefit; thus, understanding how ACCs governance can work on correcting bad economic 
performance is of crucial importance to overcome this constraint. The main objective of this paper is to 
describe the governance control mechanisms in the ACCs. Five governance mechanisms are identified: 
board and chairman change (internal mechanisms), central ACC intervention by an agent or by 
management board replacement and merger. Empirical analysis proved that the internal governance 
mechanisms activity is not related to the ACC performance. Additionally: (a)  ACCs with a central ACC 
agent and merged ACCs hold a weaker credit management and a heavy administrative costs structure and 
profitability problems; and (b) ACCs with a management board replacement by the central ACC hold a 
weaker credit management and present solvency problems.  
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 1. Introduction 
The Portuguese Agricultural Credit Cooperatives (ACCs) have their origins in the 16th century. 
However, until 1976, the ACCs played a minor role in the Portuguese banking activity, with a share of 
only 1% of total deposits and credit. Moreover, with the democratization of the country in 1974, ACCs 
were placed in the framework of a financing strategy for the development of the agricultural sector. So, 
during the eighties of the last century the ACCs activity showed a spectacular development, expressed in 
annual growth rates for deposits and credits of, on average, 40 per cent and 32 per cent, respectively. 
Nowadays, this group of agricultural credit cooperatives is the second largest national banking network 
with a standalone brand, with 120 ACCs, 400,000 members, almost 600 branches and over 1.5 million 
customers. 
However, ACCs have been developed in a top-down process, i. e., given the prevailing economic 
environment at that time, public entities considered ACCs the most appropriate form of financial 
organization which reduce or eliminate market failures, namely, farmers’ accessibility to credit. In fact, 
agriculture was (and still is) considered a risky economic activity. This makes the availability and cost of 
agricultural credit an enormous constraint to farmers, especially the smaller ones, who form the basis of 
Portuguese agriculture. We can say that ACCS are the way to oil the wheels of the Portuguese rural 
economy. 
In relation to the governance, the ACCs are regulated by the Portuguese legislation on cooperatives 
and in their banking activity they are subject to similar regulations applied to the banking system as a 
whole. But ACCs differ from banks in two important aspects: they are non-profit enterprises (therefore 
ACCs do not remunerate equity); and they do not have access to publicly raised capital. The ACCs capital 
base growth is supported by their retained profits. Thus understanding how ACCs governance can work on 
correcting bad economic performance is a matter of crucial importance to overcome this constraint and 
ensure the economic and financial survival of ACCs. 
The main aim of the paper is to analyse the determinant factors of ACCs governance control 
mechanisms. To achieve this purpose, the remainder of this paper consists of four sections. Section 2 
presents a review of the literature of governance on cooperatives. Section 3 provides a summary of some 
issues related to the governance of the ACCs. Section 4 describes the model, sample and results. Section 5 
offers some concluding remarks.   
2. Governance on cooperatives: a literature review 
The governance structure of an organization allocates income rights and decision rights, i.e., it 
determines who receives income from the use of the organization's assets and who may decide over these 
assets (Hansmann, 1996). Other governance attributes are the supply of equity capital, the assignment of 
ownership title, and the owners' control of the management. Taking the investor-owned-firm (IOF) as the 
standard, a cooperative has a deviant ownership structure and a deviant control structure. These 
differences result from the organization goal: to give its owners the highest return on investment (IOF), 
while a cooperative want to provide the best service to its members (Bijman, 2002).  
Because a cooperative is a voluntary organization all members participate in strategic decision-
making. All members elect, in general assembly, the board of directors. Democratic decision-making costs 
rise as membership becomes more heterogeneous, which reduces the commitment and increases the free 
rider problem (Bijman, 2002; Sp∅gard, 1994). Although collective decision-making has the advantage of 
keeping all members committed and making implementation of policies relatively easy, it has several 
disadvantages, namely, inflexibility, inertia, and a reluctance to start new business activities (Bijman, 
2002; Hendrikse, 1998; Reynolds, 1997). Subsequently, decision-related incentive problems may occur.   
These incentive problems are related more directly to the decision mechanisms in cooperatives and 
are derived from agency1 control issues. There is some evidence that the main problem will be more 
                                                 
1
 An agency problem occur if an organization is not being managed so as to maximize the owners’ welfare; that is, if 
residual claims are not being allocated solely to the benefit of owners. According to the Palgrave Dictionary of 
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severe in a cooperative than in an orthodox firm since the ability of members to monitor management 
seems more limited (Gorton and Schmid, 1999). More specifically, a number of intimately related 
decision problems are commonly found in cooperative organizations, such as the monitoring problem, the 
follow-up problem, the influence cost problem and the decision problem (van Bekkum, 2001; Borgen, 
2004).  
The particular agency problem in the cooperative organizations emanates from the rigidity of the 
ownership structure, consequence of two main constraints (Gorton and Schmid, 1999): first, equity can 
only be traded at face value and only between the cooperative and the members; second, the cooperative 
usually follow the rule of one-member-one-vote regardless of the amount of equity held. Thus, votes 
cannot be accumulated into blocks and there can be no monitoring by block shareholders (as suggested by 
Becht et al. (2002)). Consequently, the cost of changing control over these banks are high.  
Additionally, because of the one-member-one-vote governance structure in cooperatives, each 
member can feel disempowered as the institution adds members: many members no longer exercise their 
ownership rights and responsibilities in overseeing management. According to a recent survey (Credit 
Union National Association, 1999) voter participation rates in board elections decline as credit unions 
become larger. For extremely small credit unions (under 200,000 USD of assets), the participation rate is 
26.1%, voter turnout drops to a low of 6.2% for credit unions with 200 million USD of assets. 
Nilsson (2001) emphasized that incentive problems in cooperatives are linked to the heterogeneity of 
the membership body, the amount of financial contribution from members, the degree of contingency 
between members goals and cooperative goals, as well as the degree of members' involvement with their 
cooperative.  
There is no doubt that the membership homogeneity is vital to explain high levels of transaction costs 
associated with decision problems. But also, there are advantages of the cooperative form that should be 
explored further. For instance, the cooperative board and management are expected to be highly sensitive 
to members’ interests - qua users (Hansmann, 1996). Decision processes in cooperatives may be slow, but 
they tend to be transparent and invite to active participation. Subsequently, they may be followed by 
substantial discipline when it comes to implementation. A member is more loyal to decisions is which he 
has participated actively than to decisions that are imposed on him (Borgen, 2004).  
Some research has been made on the extent to which management serves its own interest instead of 
those of members/patrons in a cooperative organization. Fama and Jensen (1983 a, b) theorized that 
management's authority is restrained by the ability of cooperative shareholders as a group to liquidate their 
claims even without engaging in a proxy battle or tender offer. 
 Staatz (1987) presented three reasons why management and member goals can diverge in a 
cooperative organization: (1) management performance cannot be monitored through market values nor 
challenged by a threat of a hostile takeover; (2) lack of a secondary market for cooperatives restricts the 
ability of members/patrons to diversify their portfolios and consequently, they may be more risk-averse 
than management; (3) members/patrons have a claim on residual earnings only as long as they actively 
participate in the organization.  
Rasmusen (1988) and Fama and Jensen (1983 a, b) argued that cooperative members/patrons may be 
less likely than stockholders to exercise control over management by participating in board meetings or 
voting. They also argued that the boards of directors for cooperatives are less likely than the boards of 
stock corporations to monitor or replace management. Kane and Hendershott (1996) argued that the field 
of membership and cooperative structure of a credit union encourages management to align its objectives 
with those of membership, curbing managerial excesses.  
Mester (1991) found that mutually owned thrift institutions operate less efficiently than their 
stockholder-owned counterparts; she interpreted the results to be evidence of self-serving management. 
Stewart (1997) observed the existence of higher management perquisites at credit unions, when compared 
to mutual savings banks. Gorton and Schmid (1999) found that the performance of Austrian cooperative 
                                                                                                                                                              
Money and Finance, “Agency problems arise when a principal hires an agent to perform certain tasks, yet the 
does not share the principal’s objective" (Reichestein, 1992:  23).  
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banks tends to deteriorate as the number of members increases, suggesting separation of ownership and 
control. Leggett and Strand (1999) found evidence that management has served its interests by adding 
membership groups at federal credit unions.  
3. Governance of Portuguese Agricultural Credit Cooperatives: Some issues 
The agricultural credit cooperative system in Portugal is made up of an integrated system of two 
types of cooperatives: the central and the singles. Being the main institution of the Agricultural Credit 
Cooperative Integrated System (ACCIS)2 the central ACC is the top responsible and guardian for the 
running of the whole ACCs system.   
In terms of the governance, the central is responsible for the coordination and the control of all the 
affiliated3 singles' operational processes, i. e., it is the guardian of the system with a high capacity to 
interfere in the management of the ACCs and even replace their board of management. 
On the banking activity, through the singles, the central ACC, beside deposits and loans, offers a 
wide range of financial services, including, for instance, insurance operations, financial advice, exchange 
foreign currency. Acting as central ACC agent, single ACCs can perform various operations out of their 
product market4 and “services to members only” restrictions.  
Decisions in the central ACC generally obey the principle of democratic control (one-member-one-
vote), except for some specific decisions (election of the central ACC board of directors, budget approval 
and profits allocation) in which the number of votes for ACC can differ according to the participation in 
the central ACC capital equity, to the average deposits and the solvency ratio of the ACC.  
Single ACCs have three governance bodies (Figure 1): general assembly, management board5 and 
audit board. The general assembly includes all the members of the coop and usually meets twice a year, 
one for the appreciation of the annual activities plan and concomitant budget, and the other for the 
appreciation of the annual operating activities plan and budget, and the annual activities report which 
includes the balance sheet and income statements.  
                                                 
2
 The organigram of the ACCs group is shown in appendix. 
3
 ACCs are free to stay out of the ACCIS, but in that situation they must comply with the more demanding 
regulations applied to the other institutions of the Portuguese banking system.  
4
 The activity of each ACC is restricted to the county (“concelho”) where it is located, i.e., the ACCs are regional 
organizations and their product markets are limited.   
5  The common designation (in the literature) is board of directors, but considering the small scale of ACCs 
operations and their organizational structure, management board seems to be more appropriated to describe their 
role. 
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  General Assembly 
 Principle of  Democratic Control 
Competences Election of the governance bodies 
Sanction of the  ACC annual  operating activities plan, budget and report of 
activities  proposed by the board of management 
Approval of ACC merger or liquidation 
Determination of the ACC governance bodies payments 
    
                       Management Board  Audit Board 
Elaboration of the ACC annual operating plan 
and budget; 
Management of the ACC operations. 
Elaboration of the ACC annual activities report 
and balance sheets and income statements 
 Monitoring all ACC activity, ensuring 
compliance with the law and ACC statutes. 
 
Figure 1. Governance ACCs  scheme.  
 
The ACC is run by the management board6 that is elected by the general assembly and his main task 
is to oversee the daily operations of the cooperative. Generally, the management board can delegate some 
minor management tasks to qualified employees. 
The audit board, also elected by the general assembly, has as main task to assure to the members that 
the AAC is being managed according to the cooperative principles and that annual balance sheets and 
income statements reflect the true economic and financial position of the cooperative.    
Except concerning banking operations, the Portuguese ACCs are ruled following the traditional 
cooperative structure with open membership, democratic control and restricted residual claims. The strict 
application of these rules can promote a set of vaguely defined property rights, namely free-rider, horizon, 
portfolio, control problems and influence costs, with negative effects on the transaction costs (Cook and 
Iliopoulos, 2001). Nilsson (2001) suggests that the property rights allocation within the traditional 
cooperative structure does not provide members with the necessary incentives to invest, causing negative 
effects on the capital structure. Figure 2 contains a description of the consequences/effects of the 
“cooperative nature” on the financial structure of ACCs.        
 
                                                 
6
 The board of management usually includes three members who must be elected among the ACC members. 
Management skills are required. Thus, the board of management can include two additional individuals 
(management experts) not members of the ACC. 
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Owner-user   Member groups with different objectives and interests (saver-borrower conflict) 
 
Difficulty in the choice of the correct strategy  
Democratic 
control 
 Member power is independent of the participation in the equity  
 
Disincentive to major participations 
Equity 
ownership  
 Equity 
 
Minimum participations are required as admission condition  
Return on 
capital 
 No market for capital invested/No return on capital7 
 
There is no incentive to invest in the ACCs. The main source of equity is the 
annual net benefit (surplus) transferred to reserves 
Figure 2. Cooperative principles and financial structure of ACCs. 
 
The higher the transaction costs of changing control, the greater the inefficiency must be to 
trigger a change (Gorton and Schmid, 1999). In the ACCIS control changes are usually proposed 
by the central ACC that operates the auditing function and therefore, is the first to learn about 
managerial failures. In cases of gross management failure or fraud, the management can be 
formally discharged by the central ACC. Long-term inefficiencies can be solved through 
obligated mergers with more efficient ACCs. ACCs mergers act as an external control 
mechanism because, although mergers are friendly (they must be approved by the general 
assembly) the influence of central ACC is considerable, being this top institution the trigger and 
even the one that choose the merger partners (Cabo, 2003).  
On the other hand, when an ACC gets into financial distress, the central AAC have an 
incentive to protect this ACC from default because it is important to maintain the whole ACCs 
system with high reputation and confidence to the different stakeholders (depositors, loaners, 
Banco of Portugal, ...).  
Moreover, by distributing the control rights over the ACC equally across the cooperative 
members, power is actually passed to the management. Since the equity ownership structure is 
exogenous, it cannot adjust to eliminate managerial inefficiency (Gorton and Schmid, 1999). 
Moreover, because equity can only be traded with the ACC itself, a takeover by means of an 
equity acquisition is not possible. 
As mentioned earlier, ACCs face survival challenges related to financial issues linked with 
equity capital deficiencies. As ACCs capital base growth is supported by retained profits, 
understanding how ACCs governance can work on correcting bad economic performance is of 
crucial importance to overcome this constraint and ensure the survival of ACCs. In the next 
section we analyse the determinant factors of ACCs governance control mechanisms. 
 
                                                 
7
 The Portuguese law requires the net benefits to be transferred into reserves, with no return on the invested equity 
capital, which constitutes a disincentive to invest in the ACC; therefore the participation on the equity has as an 
exclusive aim: the benefit from the services of the organization, mainly credit.    
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4. Model, data and results   
4.1. Model 
To analyse the determinant factors of ACCs governance control mechanisms we used a multinomial 
logit model. This approach has been applied by several authors for banks (Anderson and Campbell, 2000; 
Barro and Barro, 1990; Blackwell et al., 1994; Crespi et al., 2004; Prowse, 1997).  
The multinomial logit is used when the dependent variable takes on more than two discrete outcomes. 
In our case it assumes values of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5, reflecting six different situations8, respectively: (0) no 
intervention; (1) board change; (2) replacement of the chairman; (3) central ACC intervention by 
nomination of an agent; (4) management board replacement by the central ACC; (5) and merger. The 
cases (1) and (2) reflect internal control mechanisms and the others, essentially external control 
mechanisms. The value of each event in the t period will be determined according to the behaviour of the 
ACC in the t+1 period. 
Multiple equations are estimated jointly in order to make efficient use of the available information 
(Greene, 2000), and the coefficients for each possible outcome are to be interpreted with respect to a 
reference group. In our case ACCs that did not experiencing any governance intervention in any particular 
year (value 0 of the dependent variable). 
In the case of the merger operation it can adopt the form of a merger or a incorporation. In the last 
one, only the ACC merger target (incorporated) was considered in the analysis.  
Central ACC intervention can take the form of the nomination of an agent, usually to decide on and 
manage credit risks, or taking a safeguard, strong and deeper decision, by the replacement of the board of 
management, which indicates that we are clearly in the presence of two different governance mechanisms. 
Board of management changes can assume the form of a partial change or a complete board change. 
The first alternative is the most usual in our sample: there are only 13 cases of complete board change. 
Furthermore, only the cases for which there is evidence that the board and chairman changes are not due 
to retirement or death are considered.  
Finally, since mergers are often followed by changes in the management board, for those ACCs that 
continue, changes in their management are not considered. 
When different mechanisms are simultaneously present we consider the one that takes deeper effects, 
i. e., in a decreasing way, from the whole data sample, the AAC-year observations for which a merger has 
occurred are first identified and a value of 5 is assigned to theses cases. With the remaining data, we 
proceed to search for the ACC-year observations with a central ACC intervention by a management board 
replacement, and a value of 4 is then assigned to them. Afterwards, we search for the ACC-year 
observations with a central ACC intervention by an agent, and a value of 3 is then assigned to them. Next, 
we check for the remaining ACC-year observations those where the chairman of the management board 
has been replaced and a value of 2 is assigned to them. Finally, we search for the remaining observations 
for those cases where the board members changed the previous year. The “board change” variable takes 
the value of 1. After all of this, the remaining ACC-year observations correspond to non-intervention 
cases, and have a 0 in our measure of governance interventions.   
As explanatory variables, we used some ACCs performance measures (Cabo and Rebelo, 2005), 
values which are quantified in the financial statements, or annual reports:   
The management of the credit risk reflected by the bad loans variable (X1), measured by bad loans 
as percentage of gross credit;  
Operational costs efficiency by the variables labour costs (X2) and other administrative costs (X3), 
both as a function of turnover (interest received + fees + other operational benefits).  
                                                 
8
 The values assigned to every governance intervention only reflect different categories, and the ordinal value has no 
further meaning.  
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As profitability measure we use return on equity9 (X4) measured after taxes. 
 Solvency (X5), measured by the ratio equity to total liabilities, trying to capture the aim of ACCs 
to fulfil the requirements of the Bank of Portugal.  
Two characteristics are used as control variables: the size of the ACC, measured by the total assets at 
the end of the year and the time period (Year). Size is often correlated with other unobserved variables 
such as asset diversification and managerial skills (Crespi et al., 2004). The time period variable controls 
shocks common to all ACCs in a given year.  
Hence, we estimate the following multinomial logit: 
Prob (Yi = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) = F (X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, Control variables)        (1) 
4.2. Data 
The analysis addresses the 1995-2003 period. Data refers to the end of the year and are all expressed 
in 1995 prices. The balance sheet data was collected from the ACCs annual reports and information on the 
mergers, board or chairman change and central ACCs intervention from “Diário da República”10. We 
excluded from the sample data 25 ACCs from 1998, because of data missing from their annual financial 
reports, plus 99 observations corresponding to different ACCs-years, as we were not able to obtain their 
chairman or management board configuration. 
At the end of this process we had a pool of 1,239 observations from 9 years of unbalanced allocation: 
a) 929 observations corresponding to ACCs not experiencing any governance intervention; b) 51 
corresponding to ACCs with board change; c) 61 chairman change; d) 51 ACCs with central ACC 
intervention by an agent; e) 79 ACCs Central ACC intervention by a management board replacement; and 
f) 68 ACCs participating in a merger.  Summary statistics for the sample are reported in Table 1, where 
the behaviour of ACCs is presented according to the governance mechanism in action.  
Comparing the information between groups, we can observe that, on average, over the 1995-2003 
period, board change ACCs, holding on average, 41.236 million euros of total assets, and merged ACCs 
are the smaller ones, with 13.824 million euros of assets. Additionally, board change ACCs hold best 
performances: minor labour and administrative costs (13.3% and 8.7 %, respectively) and the higher 
returns on equity of 36.8% and solvency (8.3%).  However, the lower bad loans ratio (8.8%) belongs to 
chairman change ACCs. 
On the contrary, merged ACCs have the worst labour and administrative costs ratio (15.8% and 10.3 
%, respectively) and the poorest performance on bad loans (21.9%) and return on equity (-800%). ACCs 
with a central ACC management board replacement have the minor solvency ratio (–17.9%).   
  
                                                 
9 An ACC’s goal is not maximizing profit but, as mentioned earlier, the key-issue for ACCs is the lack of equity. 
Therefore, as the growth in equity is fuelled completely by profit retained earnings, ROE is the correct variable 
to express the “profitability”. 
10
 Official legislative journal of the Portuguese government. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Not intervened ACCs 
 # Observations Mean Median Std. Deviation 
Total Assets* 929 36.509 26.507 34.314 
Bad Loans 929 0.092 0.074 0.073 
Labour Costs/ Turnover 929 0.138 0.134 0.045 
Administrative Costs/ Turnover 929 0.090 0.088 0.031 
Return on Equity 929 0.230 0.175 0.541 
Solvency 929 0.074 0.078 0.128 
 
Board change ACCs  
 # Observations Mean Median Std. Deviation 
Total Assets* 51 41.236 27.252 44.814 
Bad Loans 51 0.092 0.078 0.072 
Labour Costs/ Turnover 51 0.133 0.131 0.037 
Administrative Costs/ Turnover 51 0.087 0.084 0.031 
Return on Equity 51 0.368 0.205 1.135 
Solvency 51 0.083 0.078 0.060 
 
Chairman change ACCs  
 # Observations Mean Median Std. Deviation 
Total Assets* 61 30.789 25.165 27.545 
Bad Loans 61 0.088 0.083 0.059 
Labour Costs/ Turnover 61 0.146 0.153 0.043 
Administrative Costs/ Turnover 61 0.094 0.102 0.033 
Return on Equity 61 0.226 0.169 0.289 
Solvency 61 0.069 0.050 0.087 
 
ACCs with a central ACC Agent  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACCs with a central ACC management board replacement 
 # Observations Mean Median Std. Deviation 
Total Assets* 79 53.361 30.716 65.313 
Bad Loans 79 0.215 0.178 0.148 
Labour Costs/ Turnover 79 0.123 0.119 0.043 
Administrative Costs/ Turnover 79 0.083 0.084 0.028 
Return on Equity 79 -0.357 0.088 1.917 
Solvency 79 -0.179 0.019 1.604 
 
Merged ACCs  
 # Observations Mean Median Std. Deviation 
Total Assets* 68 13.824 8.318 16.294 
Bad Loans 68 0.219 0.196 0.155 
Labour Costs/ Turnover 68 0.158 0.149 0.059 
Administrative Costs/ Turnover 68 0.103 0.095 0.043 
Return on Equity 68 -0.800 0.046 2.731 
Solvency 68 -0.038 0.002 0.145 
* Million Euros 
 # Observations Mean Median Std .Deviation 
Total Assets* 51 24.995 25.254 14.682 
Bad Loans 51 0.173 0.168 0.101 
Labour Costs/ Turnover 51 0.143 0.133 0.065 
Administrative Costs/ Turnover 51 0.100 0.097 0.040 
Return on Equity 51 -0.538 0.020 1.546 
Solvency 51 -0.045 0.044 0.087 
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4.3. Results 
Table 2 reports the results of model (1) estimation. For each event, the coefficients measure the 
impact of each variable on the probability of each event with respect to the baseline case (no governance 
interventions in the following year): they are to be interpreted as affecting the odds ratio. 
Table 2. Determinants of ACCs governance control mechanisms.   
 
Variables 
Board Change  
(Y=1) 
Chairman 
Change  
 (Y=2) 
Central ACC 
Agent  
(Y=3)  
Management Board 
Replacement 
(Y=4) 
Merger  
(Y=5) 
Constant 
 
-2.704 
(0.740) 
* 
-2.816 
(0.673) 
* 
-5.095 
(0.753) 
* 
-6.217 
(0.731) 
* 
-4.082 
(0.682) 
* 
Year 
 
-0.0515 
(0.0732) 
 
-0.0922 
(0.067)  
0.071 
(0.075) 
 0.401 
(0.064) 
* 0.044 
(0.074) 
 
Total Assets  
 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
 
-0.002 
(0.005)  
-0.012 
(0.008) 
*** 0.886 
(0.003) 
* 
-0.065 
(0.014) 
* 
Bad Loans   
(X1) 
 
-0.621 
(2.427) 
 
-1.425 
(2.224)  
9.711 
(1.771) 
* 14.838 
(1.561) 
* 11.148 
(1.556) 
* 
Labour Costs / 
Turnover (X2) 
 
-1.242 
(3.961) 
 2.462 
(3.166)  
-0.229 
(3.522) 
 
-0.829 
(4.087) 
 3.007 
(2.960) 
 
Administ.Costs 
/ Turnover (X3) 
 
-0.223 
(6.023) 
 4.121 
(4.879)  
10.711 
(4.993) 
** 
-7.099 
(6.445) 
 7.455 
(4.424) 
*** 
Return on 
Equity (X4) 
 
0.228 
(0.177) 
 
-0.010 
(0.206)  
-0.297 
(0.120) 
** 
-0.171 
(0.120) 
 
-0.192 
(0.111) 
*** 
Solvency (X5) 
 
0.942 
(1.256) 
 
-0.153 
(1.054)  
0.972 
(1.014)  
-0.980 
(0.611) 
*** 
-0.928 
(0.644) 
 
Chi-squared (degrees of freedom) 363.99(35) 
Significance level 0.00 
1. Standard deviation in parenthesis 
2. *, **, ***: Significance level of  1%, 5%  and 10%  respectively. 
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The performance variables are not statistically significant for the board and chairman change 
mechanisms, i. e., they do not exercise any influence over the probability of board or chairman change.  
Thus, internal governance mechanisms activity is not related to ACC economic performance, which 
proves that these kinds of governance interventions are not linked to the ACC performance, confirming 
the weakness of the ACCs internal control mechanisms.  These results are comparable to the ones of 
Prowse (1997) who finds some substitution between regulation and other governance mechanisms in 
banks. Gorton and Schmid (1999) argue that only mergers and proxy contests are feasible for cooperative 
banks as control changes. Crespi et. al. (2004), for the Spanish banks, only observe a negative association 
between governance activity and economic performance in saving banks that merge, evidence of their 
weak internal governance mechanism.  
Furthermore, Anderson and Campbell (2000), on the other hand, explain the lack of a relationship 
between executive change and the performance of Japanese banks as evidence of the banking sector's 
inefficiencies. And Blackwell et al. (1994) find a negative relation between accounting profitability and 
management turnover in the subsidiaries of Texas' multibank holdings. 
Let’s focus our analysis on the external governance mechanisms and the performance variables. In 
the management of credit risks, bad loans ratio (X1) affects positively the probability of an intervention by 
a central ACC nomination agent, or a management board replacement, and the probability of an ACC 
participation in a merger operation.  
Regarding the operational costs, labour costs (X2) do not prove to have a significant effect on the 
probability of an ACC experiencing a central ACC intervention or being involved in a merger. However, 
administrative costs (X3) are shown to positively influence the probability of an ACC being merged or 
experiencing a central ACC intervention by an agent, which is coherent to the fact that the small size of 
the ACCs limits the rationalization11 of administrative costs (Cabo, 2003) and, according to Cabo and 
Rebelo (2005), cuts-off in administrative costs is a determining factor leading to merger operations. 
Concerning profitability, as expected, return on equity (X4) proved to influence negatively the 
probability of an ACC experience an intervention by a central ACC nomination agent or participating in a 
merger.  
Finally, solvency (X5) influenced in a negative way the probability of an ACC being intervened by a 
management board replacement. This proves the importance of the need to satisfy the requirements of the 
Bank of Portugal. Considering that solvency upgrading is expected to occur due to the increase of equity 
via better profits12, profitability improvements are decisive. Thus, management board replacement 
interventions are entirely justifiable when an ACC experience solvency problems. Furthermore, 
considering the solidarity mechanism acting in the ACCIS it is to understand this central ACC worry with 
the single ACCs solvency ratio. Curiously, Jensen (1986) argues that increases in firm leverage help to 
reduce the inefficiencies resulting from the separation of ownership and control.    
5. Conclusion 
The internal governance mechanisms: management board or chairman change mechanisms are not 
related to the ACC performance, which indicates potential weakness of the ACCs internal control 
mechanisms. Additionally, by comparing the ACCs experiencing governance intervention to those that did 
not witnessed this experience the main conclusions are: (1) The merged ACCs and the ACCs intervened 
by a central ACC nomination agent are smaller and hold a weaker credit management with higher bad 
loans and moreover they hold a heavy administrative costs structure and profitability problems; (2) ACCs 
with a management board replacement by the central ACC are bigger, hold a weaker credit management 
and present solvency problems.  
This outcome confirms the decision-related incentive problems of cooperatives, which create a 
potentially weak internal system of corporate governance and is similar to the empirical evidence provided 
                                                 
11
 Partly, as a consequence of the ongoing adoption of new information and communication technologies by the 
ACCs, it has been difficult for the ACCs to keep operational costs under control. 
12
  ACCs capital base growth is supported by retained profits. 
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by other research (Crespi et. al., 2004; Gorton and Schmid; 1999; Prowse, 1997). 
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Figure A.  Organigram of the ACCs Group. 
